Thiss threat of nomadic tribes within the areas belonging to the Ottomans only begann to recede between the second half of the nineteenth century and the early years off the twentieth century. In Persia, nomadism and semi-feudal big landlordism persistedd to coexist well into the mid-1920s (Bromley 1994 Thee pre-1850s migrations to the major cities did not seriously alter the workingg of the Mashreq formations. The radical changes of the second half of the nineteenthh century threw the relationship between urban activities -especially tradeandd rural ones asunder. Before the enactment of land laws that transformed most of thee Mashreq's countryside into private hands, agricultural communities had little contactt with urban traders, and these contacts were usually carried through the communityy chief not by individual peasants. Habib Chiha described the trading mechanismm between urban traders and shaikhs in early twentieth-century Iraq in the followingg words:
"Cee marchands sont pour la plupart des israélites parmi lesquels il y a même des orfèvres. . Enn dehors de ces petits marchands, des négociants établis dans les villes envoientt des agents qui s'assurent pour ainsi dire le monopole d'un ou plusieurs campement,, moyennant certains cadeaux qu'ils apportent au cheikh.. Grace a cess presents, le cheikh interdit 1'accès du campement aux autres concurrents." Chihaa 1908: 326 Withh the new land settlements and the opening up of trading opportunities merchantss and landowners began competing for land ownership. Alliances were eventuallyy forged between the two classes allowing for a two-way track where merchantss invested in land and landowners invested in commerce. But the social statuss of practically each and every group -a status that had been preserved for centuries--was undergoing radical shifts.
Thee rerouting of trade within the Mashreq due to the opening of the Suez Canall and the introduction of steam boats brought untold fortunes to some regions-the Iraqii provinces in general-and much suffering to others -especially the Syrian tradingg centers In 1879 the British Consul in Aleppo wrote that the Suez Canal had divertedd Iraq's exports from Aleppo, which were now transported by river to Basra andd exported from there. Baghdad's imports moved away too, but "the greater part of thee imports of Kurdistan and northern Iraq still passes through Aleppo (Issawi 1988 139) . . "Beforee the opening of the Suez Canal, Mosul used to imports all the needs of thee northern region either directly or via Aleppo. But after 1869, Mosuli merchantss found that it was more profitable to import their relatively little needs andd pilgrims to take Ihc direct route to Dar'i>ya [the Saudi capital city] and inducing Saudi-allied tribes too patrol the passageways from the Iraqi. Syrian, and Kuwaiti deserts into central Arabia. The Saudi amirss tried to destroy the other free ports in the region or. at least, to bring them under control for the greaterr glory of the Saudi state."" (Fattah 1997:51) AA nineteenth-century Baghdadi historian describes how Kuwaiti merchants took advantage of the hca\yy duties that Ottoman-control led Basra had to impose on its merchants. Thanks to their duty-free ports,, big Kuwaiti merchants became among the wealthiest ship-owners in the region (al Havdan 1872 .. Fattah 1997 . Fattahh concludes her study by asserting that "the incidence and regularity of the establishment of these markett towns is supportive of the thesis that regional collaboration created new markets in the full face off the governmental opposition ... [T|hese free ports were often survival mechanisms, built to reinforcee the tribal sector against the enveloping sweep of governmental centralization which, more oftenn that not, was a city phenomenon." . Forr a more a politics-oriented study on the formation of the Gulf emirates, see Anscombel997.
viaa Baghdad in the first place, and Aleppo to a lesser extent. In the first decade off the 20 lh century the more prosperous and active merchants of Mosul would visitt Baghdad (an 8 day trip back and forth) or Aleppo (15 day trip) once a year, orr perhaps more than that." Hassann 1965: 262 fn. Quoting a 1907 Consular report Ass for Damascus, whose trade was heavily dependent on its role as a center fromm which pilgrims to Mecca gathered, the decline began in the 1830s, when Anatoliann and Balkan pilgrims began to use the sea route to Hijaz From an average of 15-200 thousand per year, the number declined to 6000 in 1845 (2000 ( Persians, 2000 Turkss and the rest Arabs). By 1863, only 250 pilgrims came back to Damascus from Hijaz.. Persians too began to go by sea through the Gulf to Jedda. (Rafiq 1985: 250 -2 )) The decline in Damascus trade led to a decline in the rural markets with which it traded,, especially the villages of Hawran, which used to hire thousands of camels for thee transport of pilgrims, their goods and the military troops that used to accompany them.. The most important such market was that of Mzairib (2 days distance from Damascus),, where pilgrims used to gather on their way Thee introduction of modern crafts like printing, photography, ironwork, mechanicall work and so forth in the early twentieth century was a blessing to some marginall communities who were eager and capable of capitalizing on them, while the competitionn of western goods was a disaster to many traditional craftsmen in the entiree Mashreq. And the cities were the loci of the conflicts and the reshaping of boundariess between and within the various declining and ascending communities Yett it should be obvious that unless one is dealing with numerically tiny communities,, no one single community prospered or declined in its entirety For one shouldd remember that vertical solidarities never concealed the deep cleavages betweenn rich and poor within each and every large community irrespective of confessionn or ethnicity, nor did they blur senses of solidarity across ethnic/ confessionall lines when common interests were at stake. Christian and Muslim notabless sided with each other in discussing and adopting laws relating to their commonn interests, and Jewish, Muslim and Christian destitute went to the streets in numerouss protests and rebellion.
Thesee late nineteenth and early twentieth century changes brought the first radicall shift in the relationship between city and countryside on the one hand and betweenn different cities on the other. Although land ownership gained in importance andd became the major source of individual wealth and power, peasant communities saww their conditions degrading to semi-serf positions. The cities were expanding thankss to the unprecedented growth in foreign trade. Thus it is not difficult to speculatee on the fate of the early immigrants to urban centers-who were numerous as thee figures cited above reveal The rise of new 'faubourgs' on the outskirts of the citiess to accommodate those communities engaged in crafts was one avenue of employmentt as we noted above. But trade and trade-related activities were the major sourcee of assimilating the newcomers.
However,, as table 6.1 shows, the most massive waves of internal migration weree to occur some three-four decades later. From the 1930s on, these waves took placee under radically different circumstances and had different outcomes. Unlike the earlyy waves, the new ones were to become the gravediggers of the ancien regimes. Thee receptiveness of cities and their capability of preserving the division of labor amongg the various crafts, activities and communities were not functions of the personall attitudes or cultural traits of the urban population or of their notables The propertyy systems that were evolving throughout the second half of the nineteenth centuryy and the first decades of the twentieth had taken their firm shape Big landowningg and mercantile classes were now dominating social, economic and politicall life. The political structures that were decaying in the earlier case gave way too new state structures.
Thee Turkish republic was formed from the defunct center of the Ottoman empiree Egypt had regained its formal independence from the British and the Ottomans.. The Asian part of the Ottoman Mashreq was now formed of 'national' statess that either gained formal independence or were under French or British mandate.. And Persia went through the Reza Pahlavi coup of 1925 that overthrew the two-centuryy old rule of the Qajar dynasty. -19300 & 1975 -19300 & , Issawi (1988 Din (1970: 132) Althoughh still lacking legitimacy, the nascent and expanding modern state structuress with their parliamentary facades and bureaucracies seemed to be facts of lifee In sum, prospects for social mobility within the existing systems were blocked forr new immigrants whom the existing agricultural relations were throwing away. Despitee the consolidation and expansion of opulent mercantile and landowning classes,, which we have depicted in chapters one and two, the economic conditions in thee Mashreq until WWII were all but stagnant. From the beginning of the twentieth centuryy until the mid-1950s for example, Egypt's annual rise in per capita income did nott exceed 0.1 percent (al Ayubi 1989: 95) . Despite that, Middle East cities were growingg in numbers. The reasons for this state of affairs have been discussed in the firstt two chapters of this study As agriculture was increasingly commercialized and oldd loyalties disintegrating in the countryside, landowners were no longer in need of a largee workforce of their tribesmen or kinsmen. In the meantime, urban dominant classess were mostly engaged in trade, banking and real estate activities, which have a loww absorptive capacity for labor. The expansion of industrial activity was too slow to absorbb even a fraction of the migrants or urban unemployed.
Wheree did the immigrants go 9 What was the social impact of these waves of internall migration? Itt would not be unreasonable to suggest that the vast majority of immigrants weree landless peasants, mostly illiterate and unqualified. These were the ones that occupiedd such 'jobs' as domestic servants in Cairo and Alexandria, Baghdad and Basra,, Aleppo and Damascus, and Beirut and Tripoli. Although no detailed studies existt on the employment avenues of immigrants in the 1930s-1940s, one can make inferencess from indirect evidence. Interestingly enough, Egypt's national accounts statisticss in the 1940s and early 1950s carried by the Central Bank reserved a separate categoryy for the wages of domestic servants, which included personal chauffeurs and homee cooks (Central Bank 1963: 464-5) . In just three years, the total for this item rose fromm 25.5 to 28.8 million Egyptian pounds between 1950 and 1952. In relative terms thiss item rose from 2.8 and 3.4 per cent of Egypt's national income for these years; i.e.. faster than the rate of growth of the national income itself. Assuming that the monthlyy pay for a house servant in Cairo was 5 pounds, this means that there were somee 480,000 such servants when the Egyptian revolution took place in 1952
Thee first embryos of the working classes were formed from these migrants too.. However, a stagnating industry could only absorb a tiny portion of these immigrants.. Egypt, the most advanced of the Mashreq countries witnessed a decline off its non-agricultural workforce employed in industry and construction from 32 percentt in 1914 to 22 percent in 1960 22 percent in (Amin 1976 . We have noted that the main branchess of manufacturing industry were of the type that required very few qualified workers:: textile, food processing, shoes and leatherwork, etc. The slums on the outskirtss of big cities, mud huts and shantytowns, shelters made of reed on the outskirtss of big cities and even within them were (and still are) material witnesses on howw the cities dehumanized their migrants. These slums that hosted hundreds of thousandss were the mam pools from which cities drew their labor force. Unemploymentt played a crucial role in depressing the rate of pay and cheapening the workforcee for employers. Despite the spectacular rise in Iraq's oil revenues since 1952,, unemployment rates increased from 19.5 percent in 1947 19.5 percent in to 23 8 percent in 19577 (Hassan 1965 .
Migrantss themselves tended to cluster according to their places of origin, and moree often than not, they tended to work in the same jobs. This pattern of clustering ensuredd mutual support for the newcomers. The southern quarters of Beirut were almostt exclusively inhabited by Shi'ite migrants from the Beka'a Valley and Ba'albeck.. Those migrants gradually displaced the original Christian Maronites who hadd occupied the district since the beginning of the twentieth century (Jalloul 1984: 327-33) .. The northern suburb of Barza in Damascus was the new home for immigrantss from the Golan Heights. Further north of Barza was al Qaboun where destitutee migrants from Hawran found shelter The Druze, who migrated from al Suwaida'' resided in the southern quarter of al Hajar al Aswad
Migrantss to Cairo and Alexandria came mainly from the two most densely populatedd governorates of Egypt: Al Munoufiyya in the Nile delta, and Girga in the southh (el Saaty 1980:89) . These migrants tended to cluster in the sparsely inhabited outskirtss of the cities of destination El Saaty's pioneering work on Alexandria shows thee pattern of settlement in 1954, where most migrants packed the eastern, southeastern,, and to a lesser extent southwestern outskirts of the city, while the 'original'' Alexandria was a semicircle lying on the Mediterranean and surrounded by thesee new quarters from all other sides Inn Cairo, immigrants occupied the extreme southern suburbs of el Giza and oldd Cairo, or the east -al Khalifa, for example-, north -Shibra al Khaima-and the centerr -Boulaq-(al Husseini 1980: 302-33) The image that viewers of Egyptian moviess preserve of Nubians working as porters, house servants and house cooks in Cairoo is not an isolated case The Egyptian hanunak'en, those who specialized in carryingg heavy weights on their backs, descended from the village of Musha in Asuit. Theirr Iraqi and Syrian counterparts were Kurds or Jews. Drivers came from the villagee of Dair al Baqar in al Gharbiyya. Similarly, many construction workers were broughtt by contractors from the village of Tirsa in Jeeza (A Barakat 1977: 365) .
Baghdadd presents a stark, but by no means an exceptional case in point. Accordingg to the 1957 population census, 25.2 percent of the city's population had notnot been born in it. The comparable figures for Basra and Kirkuk were 12,5 and 3 percentt respectively (Hassan 1965 : 75, B. Al Najjar 1976 A survey in 1956 foundd that there were 16413 reed huts in Baghdad occupied by 92173 immigrants Thesee mainly clustered in nine quarters within the heart of the city or outside the municipall borders. In the first case high reed or mud 'walls' separated the immigrants'' huts from the residential areas. But since the bulk of the city lied on the leftt side of the Tigris river until the 1940s, many (but not all) migrants moved to the westernn side of the river: al Karkh and had their suburbs named after their tribal or provinciall origins. Thus al Tikarta quarter was named after immigrants from Tikrit, al Dounyyeenn after those from al Dor, al Tkailat after the tribe of Akeel, etc Thee segregation was not only between urbans and immigrants, but also among immigrantss themselves. Because they competed for the same jobs, immigrants of similarr social standing harbored deep feelings of suspicion towards those who came fromm other regions or belonged to other tribes, and clashes between suburbs were not infrequentt Thus reproducing the original social landscape and relations of the towns orr tribes of origin in the receiving cities served as a catalyst for turning immigrants' hostilityy against their oppressors into hostility towards urbans in general. Immigrants fromm the countryside tended to lay their hands on squatters of land in uninhabited areass east of Baghdad. Those belonging to a clan used to build their cluster of reed hutss around the hut of their shaikh, and surround their 'colony' with a wall made of reedd or mud. When al Sudan clan immigrated en masse to Baghdad in the late 1940s, theyy clustered in one of these areas to work collectively in the newly established Abboudd tobacco factory.
Migrationn waves were inevitably leading to a radical change in the compositionn of Middle Eastern cities The original city, the nucleus in which prosperouss merchants, absentee landowners and bureaucrats thrived, was cracking downn with time. The cities, which hosted a few hundred thousands until the 1930s, weree organized in such a way that not only the rich, but also the poor who served themm had their suburbs, social organizations, common habits and traditions, distinctivee dialects, support mechanisms, and interpersonal ties. The old city was a locuss of interaction among and within communities who realized that despite the envy andd jealousy, the systems of exclusions and inclusions, they needed and depended on eachh other for their living. This explains why most of the established urbans: rich and poor,, Muslims, Christians and Jews, Arabs and non-Arabs, faced the immigrants with thee same apathetic attitudes. All of them needed these immigrants, but all of them despisedd them and treated them as inferior species, and tried to isolate them in pockets thatt would keep their effects on social and cultural life at a minimum.
Butt for the new migrants, the pluralism of urban life whereby members of 'other'' ethnicities and/or confessions enjoyed enviable positions, were only explicable inn terms of the latter's playing the role of agents of a foreign enemy, or as the latter beingg foreigners themselves conspiring to deprive the true Arabs from having access too the wealth of their homelands. The source of these evils was seen as a result of the dominancee of foreign and alien elements over urban life The big city to which they hadd only recently migrated was seen as a locus of all the maladies: softy people alien too the true nature of 'men', commercial life which was seen as a departure from the morall codes of the family and tribe, non Arabs (many of whom had to live in the economicallyy depressed cities not out of choice but because they could have no access too the traditional source of wealth: land) and/or non Muslims fulfilling vital functions inn social, economic and cultural life. It was but natural that such complaints would be articulatedd within an ultra nationalist, and statist discourse Butt these perceptions by immigrants were not totally unfounded. From the end off WWI, when the new 'national' states began to emerge, until the rise of the revolutionaryy regimes a considerable section of political and administrative aristocraciess of the Mashreq was a direct descendant of the old Ottoman apparatus thatt was brought up to despise the 'local' population. Many of these preserved, and evenn accentuated at times, their Turkish or Ottoman-inherited styles of life. The Egyptiann royal family was the descendant of the Albanian Mamluks Its Iraqi counterpartt was brought by the British from Mecca after WWI to a country that they hadd never been before. Family names of Turks and/or non-Arabs whose ancestors servedd the Ottomans as Janissaries, such as Touson, Zayyour, Yakin, Buzo, Shamdin, Mardamm Bey, etc. were still dominating economic and political life until the 1950s.
Whatt the new migrants saw in the cities was the seemingly lavish life and the cityy dwellers who were insensitive to their sufferings and immune to integrating them withinn their fabric Interestingly enough, Baghdadis, Damascenes and Cairoites reservedd the 'pejorative' labels '"Urbi, 'Urban, A'rab"(meaning Arab) to villagers and Bedouins.. Would it be surprising then, that one of the greatest contemporary Arab poets,, Badir Shakir al-Sayyab, himself an emigrant to Baghdad from a village near Basra,, would write in one of his most celebrated poems: "Baghdad, a grand brothel". Later,, the Egyptian Salah 'Abdul Sabour and Ahmad 'Abdul Mu'ti Hijazi would denouncee Cairo in similar symbolism .
Byy the 1960s, the 'cosmopolitan' Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, Aleppo and Damascuss in Syria, Baghdad and Basra in Iraq, as well as Teheran in Iran and Istanbull in Turkey were disintegrating to the benefit of recomposed capital cities. And itt would take the prosperous Beirut another decade to suffer from a similar syndrome. Althoughh the migratory waves caught additional momentum following the overthrow off the ancien regimes in the Mashreq, one should stress that this process was by no meanss the product of the new regimes. Its roots are to be found in the crises of the agriculturall structures of the pre-nationalistic era and the relative prosperity of the capitall cities.
AA small pro-western class that dominated the political and economic life of the pre-revolutionaryy societies was keen on keeping its monopoly over the commanding heightss in society while, in the meantime, benefiting from the services of those migrantss who staffed the middle and lower echelons of the expanding state and militaryy apparatuses. This class was not only pro-western in the political sense, but it adoptedd western life styles, norms and habits, to such an extent that its residential areass looked more like suburbs imported from Paris or London and transplanted insidee the slums of the respective Middle East cities.
Disruptive Migration. Shifting Balances:
Althoughh the vast majority of immigrants were landless and destitute peasants, thee most articulate immigrants, who will shape the future of the Mashreq, came from differentt origins. These were the sons of small landowners, craftsmen from provincial towns,, or well-to-do peasants, who were sent to the big cities -mostly the capital cityinn order to pursue higher education, or find better jobs there It is impossible to quantifyy the number of this category of migrants. For one thing, the available figures onn internal migration detect those moving from one governorate to another. But many off those migrants actually moved from the hinterlands or provincial towns to the centrall city of the same governorate, hence their movement does not show as migrationn Another reason for the impossibility of depicting these migrants is that we doo not have a breakdown of the figures of migrants according to their social, ethnic or confessionall background, which would allow us to make approximations on who migratedd from where, and for which reasons. Nevertheless we can make some generalizationss from various indirect sources. The fact that these immigrants have radicallyy shaped the socio-political landscape of the region mainly (but not exclusively)) due to their enrolment in state jobs-especially the armed forces-provides aa way of analyzing their impact.
Thee data relating to the expansion of state employees before the 1950s are scantyy and confusing, but one thing is beyond doubt, namely the unprecedented rise in thee size of state employees and the changing role of the state Although these two latterr factors may look identical, numerical expansion and changing roles should be treatedd separately. Without the introduction and expansion of public education, a systemm supervised, run and financed by the state and based on a unified curriculum forr an entire country, the fate of these immigrants would not have been much different fromm that of the previous waves of migrations, or of thetr contemporary landless immigrantss who ended up unemployed or performing inferior jobs.
Yett an expanding state apparatus could not breed by itself the seeds of changingg the political system without the existence or rise of new trends that had the potentiall to change the role of the state and its autonomy from the dominant classes. Wee will deal first with the first aspect in some detail before analyzing the socioeconomicc roots of revolutions and the forms that these revolutions took.
Somee indirect indicators on the expansion of the Mashreq's state apparatuses andd armed forces are revealing in this respect. For example, the share of salaries in Egypt'ss state budget rose from 17 percent in 1913 to 42 percent in the 1930s, which meanss that the number of employees at least doubled in a matter of two decades (Al Disoukii 1975: 141) . The 'Guide to the Kingdom of Iraq' mentions that the number of peoplee depending on the government salaries and pensions for their living in the mid-1930ss was 37,158; i.e. 1.2 percent of Iraq's three-million population then, and approximatelyy 5 percent of urban inhabitants (around 750,000) (Daleel 1936: 251) Thee number, it seems, includes the military and police forces From 3,500 men in 1921,, the Iraqi army grew to 12,000 in 1932 (Sluglett 1976 : 260), around 50,000 in 19477 and 110,000 in 1957 (Hassan 1965 . Heydemann presents an estimate of thee expansion of state employment in Syria that covers only the departments whose budgetss were funded from the general budget and excludes large categories such as thosee working on state-funded public works projects, the military, or special and auxiliaryy budgets According to this estimate the number of employees depending on thee general budget rose from 4,772 in 1939 4,772 in to 10,144 in 1945 4,772 in and 20,862 seven years laterr in 1952 4,772 in (Heydemann 1990 5 . On the eve of the 1963 Ba'thist takeover in Syria,, the country had a standing army of 65,000 men (Batatu 1999: 158) . By the yearss of the change of the ancien regimes, civil servants and state sector employees hadd reached 325 thousand in Egypt (1952 ), 34 thousand in Syria (1958 and 58 thousandd in Iraq (1958 ) (Batatu: 1983 : 13, Hilan n.d.: 315, Mahdi 1977 .
Wheree did the recruited military come from 9 Many authors have noted the generall overrepresentation of minorities or underprivileged communities in the armed andd civil services of the third world countries. A favorite explanation for this phenomenonn are the deliberate policies of the colonial powers to rely on these minoritiess who lack a broad social base of support and therefore tend to identify and defendd the colonial masters. Reynolds noted that:
"[T]hee colonial authorities often encouraged immigration to fill intermediate positionss between the top jobs, held by Europeans, and unskilled labor, which alonee was considered suitable for the "natives". This produced a three-tier racial divisionn of labor, as in British East Africa or Burma, where the rulers were British,, the traders, clerks, and skilled workers were mainly Indian, while the indigenouss population were farmers and laborers. Throughout Southeast Asia thee Chinese filled this intermediate role, and natives of the country were largely walledd off from occupational advancement." Reynoldss 1983: 957 Inn the Mashreq, the British and French did practice a policy of organizing armiess from members of indigenous minorities for a while, but this policy did not bearr fruits and did not last long The British formed the Levies troops from Iraqi Assyrians 6 ,, and the French instituted the Troupes Spéciales from the Alawis in Syria. However,, both these did not exceed a few thousands in number and were disbanded in 19555 in Iraq, while the strength of their Syrian counterpart reached only seven thousandd at the time of Syria's independence in 1946 and was further curtailed to 2,5000 men in 1948. Given that these troops existed alongside the national armed forces,, enrolled a limited number of low-ranking soldiers, and were eventually disbanded,, it is difficult to explain the preponderance of non-majority communities in thee armed forces as a continuation of the old French/British policies of the 1920s and 1930s. .
Manyy scholars have noted that since the establishment of centrally organized armedd forces in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire and well into the midtwentiethh century these forces were held in low esteem by the wealthy and the general 55 Batatu gives the number of civilian state and public sector employees in 1960 at 33.979 (Batatu 1999: 160) .. But by that year. Syria had already experienced two years of economic nationalism and étatisationn after its short-lived merger with Egypt in 1958 and the formation of the United Arab Republicc form both countries. bb In 1935. the Levies became entirely composed of Assyrians after Kurds and Arabs were encouraged too join the newly established Iraqi army. These Assyrians were not part of the Iraqi Assyrian communityy that lived in Kurdistan for thousands of years. They were refugees who fled form Turkish Kurdistann during WWL when the Ottoman empire declared a holy Jihad that increased the tensions betweenn Muslims and non-Muslims. Some 25,000 Assyrians fled to Persia. A tragic history of famine inn Persia, the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, which deprived the Assyrians of an ally, and the resistancee of Kurdish Aghas to let them return to their homes forced them to find refuge with the Bntishh troops that had already been in Iraq in 1918 . For details, sec al Rasheed 1998 populacee at large (P. Khoury 1983: 46, 92) 7 . Upper class families rarely ventured to sendd a son to serve in the military. During the Ottoman period and even after gaining independence,, many Mashreq countries instituted the baJal (literally: substitute), the paymentt of a fixed amount of money in exchange for relieving a conscript from militaryy service; a practice that consecrated the notion that military service was a burdenn rather than a privilege, and enabled the well-to-do to spare themselves the efforts,, while laying it on the shoulders of the poor who could not afford to pay the badal. badal.
Thee armed forces of the Arab Mashreq have therefore been mostly recruited fromm lower classes The officer corps was mainly composed of those sons of lower classess who could afford to finish a few years of high schools and enroll in military academiess because their families could not afford waiting for them to pass four to six yearss in the more 'respectable' higher education institutes (Ba'eri 1969: 317-21) 8 . Ba'erii provided ample evidence on the lower-middle class background of the armed corpsess of Egypt and Iraq, which were ruled by landed oligarchies until the 1950s. Batatuu explained how the Alawis of Syria, being among the most depressed sections off the country's peasantry, were unable to pay the badal, and hence their overrepresentationn in the Syrian armed forces (Batatu 1999: 342) .
Althoughh this factor undoubtedly accounts for the preponderance of Alawis in thee armed forces, I would suggest that it is not sufficient. The reason for this is that compulsoryy conscription did not lead to advancement in the military corps, because it wass a temporary service, while the officer corps in the Middle East was (and still is) basedd on voluntarily joining a 'higher' military academy. Thus the badal only spared peoplee from the temporary compulsory service. This explains the preponderance of thee underprivileged confessions/sects or regions in the lower ranks of the military, whilee they lacked a heavy representation in the officer corps Contrary to a widespreadd impression, the Syrian Alawis in the officer corps were not as important numericallyy as the Sunnis prior to 1963 (Batatu 1999: 156) Yet they had a plurality amongg the common soldiers and a clear preponderance among the noncommissioned officerss where they composed no fewer than 55 percent of that corps in 1955.
Inn Iraq, where discrimination was systematically practiced against enrolling Kurdss and Shi'is in the officer corps, Shi'is from the southern poverty-stricken govemoratess of Nasiriyyah and 'Imara had a heavy presence in the noncommissioned officerr corps and the police respectively. But even when poor families could collect thee necessary financial amount to relieve their sons form service, they wouldn't normallyy choose to do so, because serving in the civilian, military, or paramilitary statee apparatuses was avoided only by those who had other means for social and economicc upward mobility. For the poor sections of the Mashreq societies, especially duringg the period of stagnation during the 1930s and 1940s, these outlets provided excellentt means for advancement for those who saw all other avenues blocked in their faces.. Yet the evidence point out that it is not the 'poor' in general that have a tendencyy to staff the military and paramilitary apparatuses whenever they have the P.. Khouri explains the Arabist attitude of the Damascene officers during the closing vcars of the Ottomann era by noting that these officers belonged mainly to the lower middle class and were mistrustfull of the local non-professional notables. Moreover the bureaucratic landowner class preventedd its sons for several generations from entering the military sen ice. Members of this class couldd use their influence with the state to exempt their sons from military conscription. The notables viewedd military professions as more suitable to the lower classes. Khouri adds that the scanty available dataa on the biographies of the Arabist officers indicates that as a group they were of a sociallv lower statuss than the pro-Ottoman ones.
Furthermore,, unlike other university students, cadets usually received a modest monthly payment.
occasionn to do so. The appeal of these services to marginal and marginalized communitiess seems much greater than their appeal, say to a Damascene or Baghdadi poor.. Several authors have argued that military enlistment can shape the boundaries andd saliency of a group's identity. Al Rasheed points out that: "Pariahss such as socially and geographically isolated groups seem to be receptivee to military recruitment which gives them the opportunity to establish a neww status and role for themselves. Examples of these cases include the Kurds, Berbers,, Cossacks and of course the most famous case of the Gurkhas. Military enlistmentt provides such peripheral groups in remote areas with a vehicle for gainingg respect and legitimacy." All Rasheed 1998: 49 Thee validity of this argument is evident in the case of the Middle East. But one shouldd add that the appeal of the military service to peripheral groups also stems from thee fact that unlike previously established communities who enjoyed a degree of autonomyy and had mechanisms for self-defense, Alawts in Syria, and Assyrians in Iraq,, as well as Circassians in Jordan who showed a similar tendency to join the military,, lacked these privileges. The absence of other avenues for upward mobility, thee legal and/or material deprivation of land ownership explains why such communitiess were not only attracted to enlist in the military/paramilitary forces, but alsoo to the new job opportunities, which members of other communities were not keen onn practicing, or did not have the will to learn their skills. Therefore, it is not only the coloniall policy, but more important the above factors that explain why the majority of earlyy oil workers, mechanics, car drivers, etc. hailed from such peripheral regions/ communitiess in the Mashreq.
All Khattab provided ample evidence on how the British selected members of threee Sunni Arab tribes residing north of Baghdad to form the nucleus of the officer corpss of the newly formed Iraqi armed forces in 1921. Members of al Jubour, al Bayyat,, and al 'Azza tribes formed some 25 percent of the officer corps of the Iraqi armyy in the 1920s (al Khattab 1979: 123) . Colonel al Zaidi published a comprehensivee list of the Iraqi and Turkish officers who joined the Iraqi armed forces afterr the defeat of the Ottoman empire in WWI: the number of officers who came directlyy from Turkey was 304, those who came from Syria via sea routes were 108, andd those who came via land route from Syria were 91 in number. None of the senior officerss (colonel and above) belonged to the majority Shi'ite confession of Iraq (Al Zaidii 1990:433-43) .
Thiss formula of excluding members of the majority confession, as well as non-Arabb ethnicities including those adhering to the privileged confession (such as the Kurdss who are Sunni Muslims but non-Arabs) has been pursued decades after the formationn of nationalist rule. A survey of classes 44 and 45 of the Military Academy (academicc years 1964 and 1965) showed that only 20 percent of the accepted students weree Shi'ite (56 percent of the population), 45 percent were from Mosul (Arab Sunnis),, 15 percent from Ramadi (Arab Sunnis), 10 percent from the Sunni quarters off Baghdad, and only 10 percent were Kurds, Christians, Yezidis and Turkomans. In thee Military staff academies, non-Sunnis were simply not allowed (al Zaidi 1990: 158-9) . . Inn all but two Syrian governorates, Sunni Muslims represented the majority of thee population. In al Sauwaida', the Druze formed the majority of the population and inn Latakia the Alawites constituted the majority. In this regard, Van Dam notes that:
"[M]emberss of religious minorities showed a disproportionately strong representationn in the Syrian Army and occupied politically and strategically importantt military functions, [but] the most prominent factions in power before thee takeover by the Ba'th in 1963 were mostly led by Sunni officers." Vann Dam 1981: 41 Wee will see the ramifications and consequences of this disproportionate representationn later, but suffice it to note here that over, under, or simply 'mis' representationn was not about sects, confessions or ethnicities. It was rather about peoplee originating from a common background, experiencing the same hardships, sharingg the same dreams regarding the prospects of migrating to the "cosmopolitan" cities,, and facing the same shunning, dehumanization, and exclusion by the elite of thee "cosmopolitan" city Whilee it is true that the migrants who came to play prominent roles in the politicall and economic life of the Mashreq shared much with other migrants, their differencee from the majority of the latter should also be stressed. Hence their political actss and choices, though in many ways responding indirectly to the expectations of thee majority, were by no means representative of the choices and beliefs of the majority.. On the 'destructive' side, i.e. on defining the political target for attack, there wass a quasi-unanimity. One can safely assume that the monarchies and the dominant landedd aristocracies in Egypt and Iraq were despised by the majority of the populace duringg their closing years.
Thee fragility of Syria's post-independence regimes manifested itself in the successs of three coups d'état in less than a decade. One can argue that a system based onn the domination of a landed aristocracy and opulent merchants was quite alien to thee aspirations/expectations of the majority of the population in the post-independence eraa This alone, however, does not explain the incident of revolution. Social tension couldd take other avenues, as is well known. Lebanon's opulent mercantile-landowning oligarchyy alienated itself from wide sections of the population, yet no revolution followedd Rather, a civil war erupted in 1958 We are, therefore, required to make moree precise approximations to the particular social settings.
Migrantss and non-migrants alike were not keen on preserving the status quo in thesee countries. But while many aspired to overthrow (or radically transform) these regimes,, not all had the ability to do so. Political change required much more than discontent,, which manifested itself in several street outbursts in Cairo, Baghdad, and Teheran,, among other places in the Mashreq. It required the existence of a core that hadd the capability to effect that change. And while those who succeeded in doing so didd express the bitterness of migrants and the alienated urbans towards the upper rulingg classes, they had their distinctive worldviews, which distanced them from wide sectionss of other migrants.
Thee rifts and violent clashes that characterized the early revolutionary periods (aa normal occurrence in practically all revolutionary changes) were clear indicators thatt while all parties agreed on overthrowing the existing regimes, there was little agreementt on the social, economic, and cultural programs that should be implemented,, and most important on the type of political regimes that should replace them.. But before turning to the social and ideological formation of the new political elites,, perhaps we have to present a tentative explanation of why revolutionary changess occurred in some Mashreq countnes and not in others.
Oncee again, it is novels thai give us so much insight on people's aspirations. Fawwaz Haddad quite succinctlyy shows how poor and low-income intelligentsia welcomed these coups without necessarily knowingg the political agenda of the putchists. They simply hated the old regimes (Fawwaz Haddad (2000) ) al Dhaehian wal Hawa (Hate and Prejudice'). Ibal Publishing House, Damascus, 2000).
Manufacturing Revolutions:
II have tried above to present the details that seem to provide a multi-causal explanationn for the radical changes that swept the Mashreq in the 1950s and 1960s, andd we should proceed now to link the various elements in a relatively coherent analyticall body. But one remark seems very pertinent here regarding how one should characterizee these changes.
AA question that is often raised in the academic, or militant-polemic discussions iss whether these changes, carried mainly through army officers in the form of coups d'etat,, deserve to be called revolutions, and if so, whether we should distinguish them fromm 'real' revolutions, the French or Russian for example, as 'revolutions form above'.. My view is that whether one justifies or denounces these movements, the fact iss that they have radically eradicated the previously existing property systems based onn big land ownership and merchant capital, totally displaced the ruling political classes,, and introduced novel social, cultural and economic policies, norms and practices. .
Too emphasize the novelty of the new system does not imply at all that the buds off this system were not evolving and maturing under the previous regimes On the contrary,, these changes came to consecrate these rising trends and install the rising strataa in power. Therefore, if by revolution we mean a radical change in the social system,, then these changes qualify for the terminology par excellence As for the formm that these revolutions have taken, we should keep in mind that they always came followingg a period of rising social tensions and, in Iraq and Egypt, mass movements 'fromm below', so to speak. The 'Free Officers' movement in Egypt followed bloody masss demonstrations in 1946, clashes between the British forces and the Egyptian armyy in 1950-1951, the beginning of anti-British guerilla operations in the Suez Canal,, and the riots of 1951 which instigated the famous 'Cairo fire' (Al Shafi'i 1957, Hamroushh n.d.) . The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 followed two mass uprisingss in 1948 and 1952 and numerous local peasant revolts (Marr 1985: 106-13, Farouk-Sluglettt and Sluglett 1987: 38-47) In this regard Fred Halliday and Maxme Molyneuxx note:
"Revolutionn from above is not so much an alternative to revolution from below ass an extension or fulfillment of a mass movement from below, where the latter is,, for a variety of reasons, unable to go beyond the stage of creating an atmospheree of national dissidence and to overthrow the established regime." Quotedd in Bromley 1994: 162
Iff we judge a revolution by the magnitude and intensity of the changes that it introducess to the cultural, social, political and economic spheres, then a comparison betweenn the military-led coups and the Iranian revolution seems very pertinent here. Undoubtedly,, the latter qualifies to be among the most spectacular popular revolutions inn modern history, given the level and duration of the mass activities that were involvedd in the overthrow of the Shah's regime in 1979. For the world outside Iran, thee latter's revolution might seem quite specific and incomparable to any other becausee of the Islamic ideology under which it was carried and the religious mantle of thee regime.
However,, the outcome of the revolution is strikingly similar to the outcome of thee revolutionary changes that had taken place elsewhere in the Mashreq: a monolithic politicall system, an anti-imperialist and anti-western foreign policy and ideology, extendingg the role of the state in the cultural and economic life, and the pursuance of a policyy of economic nationalism Mass popular involvement in carrying a revolution introducess specific elements and imposes additional demands on the new leadership (thee French case, for example), but its differences from changes 'from above' should nott be exaggerated.
Withh this in mind, we can proceed now with an attempt to 'explain' revolutionss in the Mashreq. In order to do this, it may be helpful to see why did revolutionss occur in some countries and not others. Revolutionary change did not take placee in the entire Mashreq region or the Arab world. It began in Egypt, when a militaryy coup overthrew the monarchy in 1952, and was followed by a similar Iraqi coupp in 1958. Syria plunged into a series of conservative, Latin American-type militaryy coups between 1949 and 1954, followed by a parliamentary republican regime,, a three-year unity period with revolutionary Egypt, a coup that reinstituted a conservativee parliamentary republic for two years before entering the radical revolutionaryy period that brought the Ba'th Party to power since 1963 Yemen underwentt a military coup in 1961 that overthrew the centuries-old medieval system underr the rule of an Imam Algeria installed its one-party rule after gaining independencee from 130 years of French colonialism Libya overthrew the Sinussi monarchiall dynasty and installed a revolutionary regime in 1969 Sudan vacillated betweenn periods of parliamentary democracy and military rule between its independencee in 1956 and the prolonged military rule that came to power in 1989. Irann had its particular brand of a popular revolution that installed an Islamic revolutionn and overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979.
Thee three decades of revolutionary changes, however, have left several parts off the region immune to coups, despite the fact that these changes have left their strongg imprints on the 'conservative' systems forcing them to adapt their functioning andd discourse to the changing realities around them. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the five Persiann Gulf Emirates, and most notably Turkey and Morocco escaped this fate 10 Lebanonn presents a special case. The country has been ruled by a parliamentary republicann democracy since its independence, but I will argue below that its two civil warss of 1958, and most importantly of 1975-1990, partially fulfilled the same functionss as the ones achieved by the Mashreq coups d'etat. And finally, Turkey went throughh two successful coups in 1960 and 1980. But both these coups did not (and weree not intended to) introduce radical changes in the country's political system or to thee composition of the leading elites. Rather, they reformulated the rules of the parliamentaryy game in accordance with the military's demands before handing power backk to civilian politicians.
AA combination of developments, it seems, can account for the similarities and divergencess of the patterns of the Mashreq's paths. First, in all the Mashreq's societiess that underwent revolutionary changes a powerful class of big landowners hadd been in place for a long period, as was noted in the preceding chapters. This class extractedd its wealth from the misery of a large mass of wretched peasants, many livingg in semi-serf conditions This situation engendered extensive waves of peasant migrationn to the city centers where their lives were not much better off. This was the casee of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Byy contrast, Jordan, the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey did not experience the dominationn of such a class; in the first cases because of the arid ecological conditions off the region, and in Turkey because the republican regime in 1923 inherited a land systemm based mainly on small and medium-sized land ownership and proceeded with aa 'modernization' project that was heavily biased to the urban sectors. However, one cann argue that in the case of Turkey, the nationalist, anti-western revolutionary change diddid actually take place some three decades before the other Mashreq countries. Kemal Ataturk'ss coup in 1923 initiated a series of reforms including the nationalization of foreignn owned companies, the adoption of five-year economic plans and state control off the major industries and financial institutions (Hershlag 1968 : 90-2, Berberoglu 1980 .
Althoughh the structure of land ownership may partially serve as a departing pointt for explaining the occurrence of revolutionary changes in the Mashreq, it leaves severall questions unanswered. Why was the revolutionary change in Iran, which had ann extremely exploitative landowning class, around two decades late compared to its otherr eastern neighbors 9 Why didn't a revolutionary coup d'état take place in Lebanon,, despite the fact that its land ownership system was similar to that of Iraq, Syria,, and Egypt 9
Thee pressures for reform in Iran began earlier than anywhere else in the Mashreqq In 1906, a popular revolt against the absolute monarch of the Qajar dynasty forcedd a short-lived reform on the Shah who reluctantly introduced a form of constitutionall monarchy. In 1952, popular vote brought the legendary prime minister Dr.. Mosaddegh to power. His constitutionally elected government took the unprecedentedd decision of nationalizing the multinational oil industry. The price he paidd was a bloody CIA-engineered coup d'etat in 1953. So, the yearning for reform wass there in Iran. But the Shah, aware of these trends in his society, and alarmed by thee radical change around his country in the late 1950s, initiated a program of mild landd reform in 1961 and 1963 that was intended to forestall radical changes. In retrospect,, one can see that this program only delayed revolution As these reforms weree unable to engage the emancipated labor force into any rewarding activities, majorr Iranian cities, especially Teheran, underwent the same ruralization process wheree sprawling shantytowns encroached upon the established urban orders, eventuallyy suffocating them (Abrahamian 1991: 118).
Lebanon'ss land system was no less oppressive than elsewhere in the Mashreq Sociall tensions between peasants and landowners showed in several revolts and acts off protest. The absence of powerful group dedicated and able to change the system hass to do with the other two factors that I propose to explain change in the Mashreq. Onee is the potential for the state to gain some relative autonomy vis-a-vis the major actorss in society, and the other is the existence of an economically rising group who seess its ability to further development, and the translation of its economic rise on the sociall and political levels blocked by the existing elite This rising group must, moreover,, be capable of casting its aspirations in ideological terms that could appeal too the majority of the population and not only to its members. Obviously, the ability to castt particular interests as national ones is not only a matter of ideological manipulationn by the rising group. In order to be viable, a socio-political change must producee benefits to social groups other than the would-be dominant one Thee Mashreq states that underwent revolutionary change had already begun interveningg in the economy since at least WWII, with various degrees of success The spectacularr rise in the shares of governments' oil revenues in Iran and Iraq since 1952 allowedd the state in both countries to develop that autonomy after decades of dependencee on external aid and/or taxing the land and commercial activities. The fees fromm the Suez Canal gave the state in Egypt a modest independent source of finance. Thee Syrian state had less chances of autonomous development However, when the countryy gained its independence from the French in 1946, the latter agreed to hand backk the relatively large amounts of Syrian gold reserves, partly in cash, and partly by abandoningg the French enterprises to the Syrian government as a form of payment Thee Lebanese state, by contrast, was an exception in this regard Following an ultra-liberall economic policy, the state left a flourishing mercantile/banking activity intactt and became ever more dependent on the revenues accruing from taxes on these andd the agricultural activities With Lebanon turning into the Switzerland of the Arab world,, any revolutionary change via capturing the state would have produced negative effectss even for those strata that may aspire to enrich themselves via capturing state powerr The multi-confessional structure of Lebanese society made it impossible for anyy single group, including the armed forces, to impose radical changes on society andd expect to be met with acquiescence 1 V Too this anomaly one should add the second factor that hampered change in Lebanonn in the way that the other Mashreq countries experienced The Lebanese economy,, just like the majority of other Mashreq countries, was expanding during the firstt post WWII decade This implied the rise of new strata whose further developmentt was blocked by the dominant oligarchy, and the persistence of poverty amongg wide sections of the population. This should have presented a golden opportunityy for revolt, because it is the widely perceived boom, accompanied by stagnantt living standards of a significant mass that ferments rebellion and not a generall atmosphere of poverty or stagnation Here too Lebanon differed from most of thee Mashreq countries in at least two aspects. One is that the standards of living of the populationn in general were above those of the rest of the region. And despite the gross inequalityy in income distribution, the poor saw their living standards on the rise duringg the 1950s and 1960s, and unemployment rates were much lower than elsewheree in the region. The second is that Lebanon's post independent constitutional compromisess consecrated and perpetuated the Ottoman mechanisms of indirect rule andd thus obstructed the rise of a civil society where the individual is connected to the statee without any mediators.
Despitee the modern facade of a parliamentary rule, a multi-party system, and a freee press, unwritten rules dictated that the president must be a Maronite Christian, the primee minister a Sunm Muslim and the speaker of the parliament a Shi'ite Muslim. Hence,, whereas the post-war social mobility in the Mashreq was gradually paving the roadd for the rise of individuality and citizenship, Lebanon preserved the formula by whichh members of the different sects would be represented in the state structures via 'their'' notables. This formula was a recipe for peaceful coexistence among the various communitiess that compose the Lebanese society, but it also proved that in order to translatee the changing balances among these communities, civil war was the means.
New leaders in Search of Constituencies:
Radicall changes took place in countries that had been characterized by: 1) the dominationn of big landed aristocracies and mercantile classes; 2) an increasingly autonomouss role of their states, and 3) the rise of social strata whose further advancementt was blocked by the dominant landed and mercantile classes, and who couldd present their revolutionary cause in a way that appealed to wide masses of the oppressed. .
Understandingg the backgrounds of the immigrants who came to play the leadingg roles in the Mashreq is essential to understanding the ideological framework, thee political practices and the socio-economic programs that they introduced to their respectivee societies and to explain how they imposed acquiescence on the majority of thee population. It may be ironical that the changes, which were the direct product of thee crises of systems dominated by the big landed aristocracy, were not carried by its directt victims.
Despitee some differences in the backgrounds of the leaders of the nationalist regimess in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, two striking lines of similarity among them must be pointedd out. The first is that none of them came from any of the major two or three citiess in their respective countries. And the second is that virtually none of the new leaders,, or their parents, had experienced direct subjugation to the oppressive machineryy of big landed aristocracy They either hailed form regions whose topographyy did not allow the rise of big estates, or belonged to the lesser notability of smalll landowners that did not suffer directly from semi-feudal exploitation and degradationn ".
Off the nineteen members that composed the military committee that was to playy the leading role in Syria since 1966, none descended form sharecroppers or landlesss families. Ten of these members and four out of the five inner core of the committeee descended from lower or middle class peasants (Batatu 1999: 145) Others weree the sons of petty clerks or employees who experienced, in one way or another, thee humiliating dominance of the French and British on their country's affairs. Egypt'ss leader Gamal Abdul Nasser was the son of a postal clerk His deputy Abdul Hakimm 'Amir came from a wealthy peasant family The father of his successor and companionn Anwar al Sadat was a clerk with the army. Zakariyya Muhiyildin, a long timee strong man in Nasser's regime, came form a middle class family of landowners (Hamroushh nd : 70-98). The composition of Iraq's Revolution's Command Council, whichh is the body that governs the country since 1968, reflected the same pattern Out off the fifteen members that sat in this body during its first decade in power, eight camee from a rural background (peasants, petty agricultural entrepreneurs and petty landowners),, and the fathers of four members were policemen, vendors, and petty tradesmenn (Batatu 1978: 1090-91).
Somee of these immigrants did not descend from peasant families Their rural townss were the centers of crafts or services that were eclipsed by the introduction of neww transport technologies and/or competition form cheaper and better products from thee west or from other regional centers. In the nineteenth century 'Ana, a rural town onn the upper western bank of the Euphrates in Iraq, was a center for the production of womenn gowns ('Aba) that was eclipsed by competition from French and Syrian productss with the improvement in transport technologies. Tikrit, on the other hand, specializedd in the production of kalaks, rafts that were used to transport goods from Mosull to Baghdad via the Tigris River Once in Baghdad, the kalaks were dismantled andd their precious wood was used as fuel because it was very difficult to navigate upstreamm in the Tigris. With the introduction of steam power, Tikrit began its decline Butt using the kalaks continued until the 1940s, when new railroads linked Mosul to Baghdadd and paved roads facilitated transport by cars The depressed situation of Tikritt can be gauged from the fact that its population showed no increase in two decadess from 'around 5000 ' in 1929 to 5770 in 1947 (Daleel 1936 : 846 ff, al Aqeeli 1995 . .
Thiss background, common to most of the leaders of the nationalist revolutions off Egypt, Syria and Iraq, has been, along with other factors, instrumental in shaping thee outlooks and social programs of the 'radical' leadership of the Mashreq region. Butt portraying the new Mashreq leadership in this way may give the impression that thiss analysis is an additional evidence to the widely held notion that political leadershipp in this part of the world has a free hand in molding passive societies, and thatt whoever manages to capture the state machinery can steer the course of events accordingg to his wishes. An analysis of the courses of these revolutions will show that thiss is an unfounded opinion and that the final shape that the revolutionary regimes havee taken was due, to a large degree, to the forceful pressures that these regimes had facedd from social actors, who despite being unorganized and lacking the means of transmittingg their demands, could make their aspirations and disappointment felt by thee rulers.
Interregnum: Prelude to Rupture
Inn all the countries that underwent radical changes, a strikingly similar pattern hass characterized the revolutionary processes and the composition and rifts within the neww ruling groups-an aspect which has drawn very little attention by analysts despite itss huge significance. The first leaderships of the revolutionary regimes were either predominantlyy urban, or had symbolic urban figures heading them. And in all these cases,, there were figures who had played prominent roles in society and in the 'establishment'' politics, or had occupied relatively prominent positions under the defunctt regimes. Finally, in all these cases, the new leaders tried to give the impressionn that they were preserving some semblance of continuity with the constitutionall norms of the ancien regimes, that were based on the formal separation off the executive, legislative and judiciary bodies Egypt'ss first leader was Brigadier General Muhammed Neguib, a prominent officerr bom to an officer father. The revolutionary regime overthrew the monarch, but nott the monarchy. The officers worked under the formal leadership of a regent to the thronee and a civilian government (which incorporated several 'free officers') headed byy one of the monarchy's politicians. Only two years after the revolution was the monarchyy declared dead, the republic instituted, and Neguib was put under house arrest. .
Iraq'ss revolution immediately overthrew the monarchy and declared a republic.. However, the leaders of the first republican regime (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) emphasized thee 'interim' nature of their regime, whose role was to reform the political system beforee handing it back to civilian politicians who were supposed to compete for seats inn a reformed, multi-party parliamentary system. A symbolic and powerless 'sovereigntyy council' was formed of prominent figures to fill the jobs of a head of state.. And actual power resided with the cabinet and its premier General Qassim. Qassimm himself was one of only sixteen individuals who held that rank at the time of thee revolution -an indicator of his incorporation into the elite bureaucracy-and the 188 8 urbann structure of his cabinets was very pronounced: 64 percent of the ministers were bomm in Baghdad, Basra, or Mosul The comparable figures for the period 1963-1968 weree 37 percent, and 25 percent for the first decade of the Ba'thist regime (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) ) (Tikriti 1976 : 276, al Khafaji 2000 .
Syriaa presents an interesting case where the same party has been in power sincee 1963. One would therefore expect that no significant change has occurred in the structuree of its leadership over the years Yet, this is far from true. Two 'internal' coupss (in 1966 and 1970) and numerous shuffles and splits fulfilled the 'ruralïzation' functionn Although the Syrian Ba'th acquired a pronounced rural and provincial coloringg since the 1950s, the party leaders were keen on preserving the traditions of appointingg Sunnis from the major cities to the posts of president and prime minister untill 1970. Batatu's analysis of the Ba'th leadership concentrates on a period that beginss six months after the assumption of power by that party.
However,, Van Dam shows clearly that in the period between March 1963, whenn the Ba'th assumed power in that country, and 1966, when the 'left wing' ousted itss rivals, 2 percent of the commands of the party were Sunni Damascenes, 8 percent weree Sunnis from Aleppo, 10 percent Sunnis from Horns, and 10 percent Sunnis from Latakiaa (Van Dam 1981: Appendices, table 3)'\ Thus members from al Bitar Damascenee family, the notable Hamah family of al Attasi, or the Aleppo, or the Aleppoo bom Amin al Hafidh occupied these jobs during the first years of the Ba'thist revolution.. By September 1963 descendents from the major five Syrian cities representedd only 17 3 percent of the total individuals (and 24 5 percent of the total members)) of the party's leadership. These percentages dwindled further by February 19666 to 8 4 and 12.4 respectively in the four following years (see table) .
Evenn the radical Islamic revolution in Iran did not depart from this pattern. Thee first president was a non-cleric, as well as the first prime minister who came from aa political organization that adhered to the secular line of the 1952 deposed prime minister,, Muhammed Musaddegh.
Severall conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. The first regards thee impulse for changing the ancien regimes. It is clear that not only rurals or descendantss from rural towns were against these regimes, but a wide section of the urbann population including some well-placed people. Without support form the latter, itt would have been very difficult to achieve success in carrying political change, since urbanss could (and did) neutralize many influential and vacillating strata, and had accesss to the reigns of power. ss with populations of more than 50,000 in 1960 or more than 100,000 in 1970. Source:: Batatu 1999: 164 AA second conclusion regards the pace of change and the popular pressures that madee further radicalization possible It should not be surprising that promulgating and implementingg the laws on land reform, a major step with which the radical regimes havee been associated, took place during this 'first stage' in all the Mashreq's revolutions.. Ironically, these reforms unleashed pressures that were to undermine the politicall base of those who enacted them. The first-stage leaders did not intend to go muchh beyond curtailing the power of big landowners and punishing the old politicians.. Radicalized masses of unemployed immigrants who had never been to the ballotss or understood party politics, and peasants for whom the liberty of the press meantt very little -if anything-could not understand the hesitation of their leaders to abolishh all these practices. Many of them never heard of the names of those personalitiess that the leaders were hesitant to throw in prisons or even execute. Many off the new leaders either hailed from modestly propertied classes or had at least some personall encounters with the merchants and industrialists whom the newcomers to the citiess saw as major opponents. In sum, whereas the urban leaders viewed revolution ass processes aimed at redressing a course and returning things to 'normal', others saw themm as the beginning of paths towards an unexplored heaven, or as an insightful analystt of the French revolution aptly put it:
"Mostt revolutionary histories present themselves as linear: a passage in time fromm oldness to newness. But they can hardly avoid circularity. In its early usage,, revolution was a metaphor drawn from astronomy, signifying the periodicc turning of the sphere. It implied predictability, not unpredictability. "Thee World Turned Upside Down", as the popular anthem of the American Revolutionn was called, paradoxically implied an adjustment to its becoming rightright side up Correspondingly, the men of 1776 (and still more the framers of thee Constitution) were more concerned with preserving order than with perpetuatingg change Some of the same nervousness was apparent in France in 19Ü Ü thee way the men of 1789 used the word-But in their case, its transformative rhetoricc overwhelmed any apprehensive second thoughts. Curiously, those who hopedd for limited change in 1789 were the most given to the hyperbole of the irreversible.. And from that time on revolution would be a word of inauguration, nott repetition." Schamaa 1989: 6-7 Clearlyy then, social tensions in the Mashreq societies left tremendous effects onn the shape and content of political power. The first revolutionary regimes were renderedd transitional by the large disenchanted masses that saw them as reformist and mild.. The cleavages, it must be stressed were not between poor and rich as such Generallyy speaking, the trade unions and urban workers tended to side with the 'reformist'' regimes rather than with the more radical populism of the nationalist movements.. And it is this dilemma that contributed to eclipse some of the rising politicall organizations and the rise of others.
Thee complex configuration of -active or passive-social actors during the revolutionaryy periods can be portrayed as a matrix of four blocks: the landowning and merchantt classes, the middling and poor urbans, the destitute migrants, and the betterofff migrants. As in any other schema, this matrix tends to simplify a more complicatedd reality as many nuances, subdivisions, conflicts within each block and sub-blockk interactions are not portrayed in it The first block, landowners and merchants,, was targeted by the three other as the source of the perceived societal and politicall maladies. Despite the overall animosity towards that first block, the urban poorr and middling strata shared social norms, values and collective memories with the urbann merchants in particular. The two migrant blocks shared values but no common interests,, apart from doing away with the ancien regimes Perhaps, it was this complex sociall configuration that allowed the rising migrants to assume the role of a bridge wheree the three blocks could find their common meeting points, through bloody conflictss and clashes to be sure.
Inn an atmosphere of severe competition, the radical political parties in the regionn adapted with varying degrees of success to the changing realities in the Mashreqq countries. In the meantime, non-radical opposition parties that had been vocall during the pre-revolutionary era ceased to exist altogether The Egyptian al Wafd,, the Iraqi National Democratic Party and Independence Party, the Syrian Nationall Party and the People's Party, and the Iranian Partisans of Freedom Party welcomedd the revolutionary changes, but they were not viewed favorably by those whoo would play the leading roles during the 'second stage' of the revolutions. The reasonss are not hard to discern These parties were mostly urban-based. Their leadershipss were almost exclusively urban Their political practices revolved around parliamentaryy politics and a facade of pluralism. As the revolutions introduced new sociall actors to the political arena, these parties were seen at best as relics of the past thatt had played a positive role but have no reasons to exist since the demands put on theirr political programs have been fulfilled, and even surpassed by the revolutions.
However,, it would be preposterous to assume that the relative success or failuree of particular trends and organizations to adapt to the changing realities and to expresss the aspirations of the majority of the oppressed can be accounted for by the talents,, skills or strategies adopted by their leaders. Social changes tended to reflect themselvess in the composition, outlook and strategies of the radical organizations moree or less in an inadvertent way. Given the clandestine or semi-clandestine nature off these organizations, the changes occurred though splits, expulsions and heated struggless within organizations. The particular problems facing each of the Mashreq's countries,, and the ideological mantle under which each of these organizations operatedd imposed their constraints on the degree that each trend could adapt to changingg needs and realities and determined to a large extent the trend that was more accommodatedd to express them more effectively Veryy few doubted the corruption of the old sociopolitical systems of their respectivee countries, but the way each section of the underprivileged classes viewed thiss corruption was different from others. Shared grounds could be found of course, providedd that some other manifestations of the corrupt system were relegated to a secondaryy position. For example, the overrepresentation of Jews and Christians in the higherr grades of the chambers of commerce and in the banking and real estate activitiess could be attributed to class divisions and the infiltration of agents of imperialismm among Moslems and non Moslems alike, as the Marxists did' 4 But any referencee to these minorities as being non-authentic citizens would jeopardize the basiss upon which these organizations were founded, namely that national liberation is aa matter of class struggle rather than ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the communists of Iran,, Syria and Iraq, among the most popular parties in the 1940s and 1950s in their respectivee countries, had a significant membership of underprivileged minorities for whomm an ideology stressing equality among citizens irrespective of their sects, confessionss or ethnicity was very appealing The bulk of the membership of the Lebanesee communist party was composed of Orthodox Christians and Shi'is, in additionn to Armenians and a few Maronite Christians or Sunms.
Onn the other hand, nationalist feelings, which ran high among all of the underprivilegedd (and even many privileged) strata, could easily be incorporated withinn chauvinistic semi-Nazi ideologies, which tended to play on the instincts of the poorr by portraying the privileged merchants as alien conspirators plundering their countriess hand in hand with the British and the French, not because of the social positionn that the former occupied, but because they belonged to sects/ethnicities whosee loyalty to the nation was questionable. Until its merger with the Arab Socialist Partyy in 1952, a party that had much support among the Syrian peasantry because of itss emphasis on the corruption of the landowners and the need for land reform, the Ba'thh party showed very little, if any, sensitivity towards the oppressed social classes. Alll the members of the Ba'th Executive Bureau from its founding in 1945 to the party'ss merger had their roots in Syria's main cities and towns Hence the absence of anyy reference to landlords or exploitation in the numerous writings of the founding fatherr of the party (Batatu 1999: 136) . In the 48 articles Ba'thist Constitution adopted inn 1947 and composes the party's general principles, the character of Arab socialism's economicc policy is described in a purely nationalistic discourse. Article 26 states that "Thee Arab Ba'ath Party is socialist, believing that the economic wealth of the homelandd belongs to the nation (Gottheil 1981: 247) .
Butt how could the originally urban Ba'th succeed in mobilizing, or at least gainingg the acquiescence of the migrants and declasse, while the communist failed? It seemss that the ideological framework of 'pure' nationalism can only provide a partial answer.. The success of nationalistic agitation naturally varied according to the concretee situation of each of the Mashreq societies. The dominance of western interestss was palpable in the entire Mashreq, naturally. Ownership of the Suez Canal, thee oil industry in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, the humiliating occupationn of Egypt by British troops in 1882 and their continues presence there and inn Iraq, and the 1953 CIA intervention to overthrow the democratically elected governmentt of Iran, were daily reminders of that presence to the ordinary people ".
Longg before the Ba'thists, the communists championed the causes of national liberationn and were among the first to denounce the domination of foreign capital on nationall resources. But nationalism -or more accurately revolutionary nationalism-is nott only a function of the domination of foreigners, otherwise we would have witnessedd such nationalist explosions in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates. It is an ideologyy that is best couched on the existence of oppression and misery on the one hand,, and the rise of articulate groups who feel that their interests, which they may vieww as the interest of the whole nation, can be furthered by doing away with foreign domination.. And these conditions were fully there in the countries that underwent revolutionaryy changes in the Mashreq.
Paradoxically,, Syria, was the country in which foreign domination was least palpable.. It had gained its full independence in 1946, and the French debts to the countryy were used to buy the foreign owned public utilities (electricity, trams, etc ) andd turn them into Syrian state property. Trade activity was (and still is) in the hands off the powerful local Sunni merchants of Aleppo and Damascus Nevertheless, foreignn capital still held powerful positions in the economy, as the following table suggests. . Yet,, it seems that the success of Ba'thists in Syria had less to do with nationalismm than with its socially refurbished image and policies after the merger with thee Arab Socialist Party, as the above cited figures on the high percentage of rurals in itss leadership, even in the early 1960s indicate. It seems, in fact, that unlike the Iraqi Ba'th,, which preserved its insensitivity to social problems until the end of the 1960s, thee Syrian Ba'th's "socialist" tone appealed more to the masses than its purely nationalisticc one 16 .
Byy contrast, a predominantly Shi'i Iranian population could easily target the opulencee of the tiny Jewish and heterodox Baha'i communities as signs of animosity off whole communities (or faiths) to the national interests. The same could be said aboutt Egypt, where Christian Egyptian merchants held a disproportionately high percentagee of the trading activity (see Thee paradox, however, lied in Iraq, where the majority of the population is Arabb Shi'ite (around 55 percent) while political power has always resided with Arab Sunniss (around 20 percent of the population). Because of the traditional dominance of Sunniss on the state, urban Shi'is, who had the means to pursue higher education, or hadd access to some resources directed their activities to trade and liberal professions. Untill the mass exodus of the Jews following the creation of Israel, the latter dominatedd the trade and banking sectors, while the Shi'ite merchants came second Thee preponderance of Shi'ite merchants became very evident after 1948, when the latterr had a virtual monopoly on banking and commercial activities. Yet the most wretchedd peasants and migrants to the cities were also Shi'ites from the southern governoratess of Iraq, as well as the Kurds Whereass Syrian minorities: Ismarilis and Alawis for example, harbored feelingss of mistrust towards the predominantly Sunni elite, who besides dominating mercantilee activity in the cities was their direct exploiter as peasants, such a rift was nott so clear cut in Iraq. Shi'ite as well as Sunni landlords exploited Shi'ite peasants. Kurdishh aghas were the masters of Kurdish peasants. The impoverished masses of migrantt peasants, as well as the established urban workers, tended to view their miseryy more in terms of explicit class oppression than in sectarian or ethnic terms. Thiss may partly explain the amazing success of the Iraqi communist party in gaining masss support until around the mid-1960s, whereas Ba'thism was hardly a popular currentt in that country.
Too put it differently, in all the countries that underwent revolutionary changes inn the Mashreq, the most successful political trends were those that could create a sensee of national unity in the face of western colonial powers and their local allies Syria'ss social divisions were mainly of religious/sectarian nature, and therefore an Arabistt ideology appealing to the actual or perceived Arabness of the vast majority of thee population irrespective of their confessions could fulfill that role By contrast, Iraq'ss divisions were mainly ethnic ones. An Arabist ideology alienated large sections off the population, while the communists managed to transcend the nationalist cleavagess by emphasizing class unity, which had the potential to appeal to Shi'is and Sunniss alike. ------4 4 5 5 9 9
--2 2 7 7 1 1 --10 0 ** Membership included companies and individual merchants and tradesmen. The gradingg of classes reflected wide differences First class membership was for those withh 'a financial consideration limit' of 75,000 dinars (one dinar = one pound sterling),, while the sixth for a 'financial consideration of a mere 100 dinars. Source:: Batatu 1978: 245
Thee receptiveness to each variant of the radical ideologies largely depended on thee specific situation and common experience that a particular group of migrants faced,, and the specific situation of each of the Mashreq societies. Syria and Lebanon weree no less diverse societies than Iraq as we have seen above. But their diversity was confessionall and not ethnic in the first place. True, Syria and Lebanon had their non-Arabb citizens: Kurds, Armenians, Synacs and Assyrians. But these composed tiny percentagess of the population and Arabic was becoming the dominant, if not the sole, spokenn language, in both countries Kurdss in northeast Syria and Armenians in Damascus and Aleppo kept using theirr languages. But the Damascene Kurds, many of whom occupied high positions duringg the Ottoman era, melted in their Arab milieu and ceased using that language forr generations. Armenians kept teaching their children their mother language and had theirr own schools, but their minority situation and living in Arabic speaking cities and nott in exclusive enclaves of their own, made it impossible for them to demand recognitionn as a culturally ethnic identity Thiss was not the situation in Iraq, where despite the Sunni-Shi'ite cleavage, a largerr majority of the population belonged to non-heterodox Islam . There were severall other non-Muslim groups to be sure: Christians, Jews, Yazidis, Sabeans, as welll as heterodox Muslim sects. But the biggest source of diversity was ethnic, the moree so after the mass exodus of Jews. Although the Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims,, they could not identify with Sunni Arabs because, in addition to being persecutedd by Sunni-dominated Arab regimes, the cementing element of the post-Ottomann Mashreq was nationality defined as synonymous with ethnicity. Another differencee between Syria and Iraq lied in the fact that in the former there was a clearcutt majority for a single ethnic-religious group; Arab Sunnis constituted some 72 percentt of the population. In Iraq, most of the Arabs were Shi'ite, but Arabs only constitutedd some 70 percent of the population. Sunni Muslims constituted more than 500 percent of the population, but only if we lump Arabs with Kurds together. The Kurdss had their own distinct identity that kept them apart from Arabs, Shi'is and Sunniss alike. Therefore, while Ba'thism and pan-Arabist ideology in general appealed too non-Muslims in Syria because it upheld the concept of equality of all irrespective off their religion and sect, it was a time bomb for the Iraqi Kurds, Turkmans, Chaldeans,, Armenians and Assyrians, who formed distinct ethnic groups that preservedd their cultural traits and languages.
Thesee factors combined might explain the differences and the commonality in thee trajectories of the Mashreq countries. Whereas the radical changes that swept the regionn since the 1950s can be attributed to the bursting off of the sclerotic social systemss that had been in place since the end of WWI, notably their incapacity to cope withh the waves of migration and urbanization and the crises of the agricultural structures,, the forms that the radical changes took were not quite uniform. Improving economicc conditions following WWII exposed and magnified social cleavages. Those strataa that saw their fortunes on the rise due to WWII and its aftermath either could notnot enhance their positions any further, or had to acquiesce to playing subordinate sociall and political roles in a system where roles had been already defined and monopolizedd by a tiny aristocracy.
Transitional Revolutionaries:
Thee revolutionary developments since the end of the 1950s swept the old rulingg classes away from the political scene. The 'transitional' revolutionaries followedd suit after a few years as the huge pressures for radicalizing the course of revolutionaryy changes made it possible for rural and provincial town immigrants to takee full control of the state apparatuses of the Mashreq Theoretically, this should leadd one to expect the establishment of more representative and therefore more democraticc political systems since these immigrants formed the majority of the new urbann spaces and had so much to share with the aspirations of the peasants. However, inn all these cases the evidence shows that tyrannical leviathans under the rule of tiny cliquess were the outcomes of these changes And it is of utmost importance to attempt too understand this paradox Thee interaction of two sets of conditions may account for the outcome of the revolutionaryy changes in the Mashreq, one is the social configuration at the time of thee revolutions and the other is the changing relationship between states and societies sincee the early 1950s. The mass migrations coupled with the virtual absence of expansionn in the formal, organized urban sectors -the same phenomena that instigated change--had their necessary corollary; namely that the new regimes stood above atomizedatomized societies. The vast majority of the population was neither organized economically,, nor politically. Their aspirations, pressures and disenchantment could bee felt and transmitted in indirect ways, but they had no way of putting collective demandss systematically. What little organized action could be carried out via radical partiess and trade unions, repression and hostility towards collective acts by the prerevolutionary,, as well as revolutionary, regimes were able to isolate .
Obviously,, suppression could not achieve these results were it not that organizedd action and organized sectors were turning more and more into isolated acts duee to the atomization of the population Whereas in the 1930s and 1940s a strike wouldd have had a destabilizing effect on the ruling elites, and thereby on the political structuress that were heavily linked to these elites, such acts no longer weighed as heavilyy in the 1950s and especially after the revolutions. Not only the changing social configurationn and the changing relationship between the new regimes and the dominantt elites were the reasons behind that, but also the changing relationship betweenn states, dominant classes and societies.
Untill around the mid-1940s, Mashreq state leaders harbored ambivalent politicall attitudes towards their social base: the big landowners and merchants These attitudes,, very similar to those of European absolutisms, can be described as the desire too see the monarch and his/her retinue stronger than any single local power holder on thee one hand, and the desire to keep local power holders in control of their .subjects on thee other hand The first tendency is not difficult to understand obviously It was the recipee for putting an end to separatist attempts at state building and thereby to enforce thee acceptance of the fact that modern structures were there to stay The new inventionn of air force, which the unfortunate European absolutisms lacked, proved to bee a formidable means to suppress local revolts and demands for more autonomy for thee local power holders and their subjects 1 ".
Onn the other hand, the desire to keep local power holders in control of their subjectss stemmed from the fact that the legitimacy of rulers and their state structures restedd upon the allegiance of the functional chiefs of various communities to their authority.. Chiefs of tribes, village notables, religious leaders, and merchants who playedd the role of notability in their respective suburbs or city quarters, were the meanss through which the population could be controlled and appeased. Parliamentary rulee -a fraudulent one to be sure-served as a means to enforce indirect rule, rather thann building modem centralized states. A glance at the above-cited tables on the distributionn of parliamentary seats of the Mashreq should be sufficient to make the pointt that the 'modem' institutions were adapted to 'premodern' social conditions, andd local chiefs were the intermediary layers between central state bureaucracy and thee subjects 20 .
Butt the figures on the social backgrounds of the members of parliaments and cabinetss in the last years of the ancien regimes also give a partial indicator of the changingg relationship between dominant classes and their constituencies. For despite thee concerted efforts to rig the election and preserve the status quo, the rising number off independent professionals and personalities close to the progressive parties who couldd enter the parliaments of the Mashreq is a clear indicator of the detachment of growingg numbers from their 'traditional' local leaders. The numerous street riots in thee cities and peasant revolts and exodus from the countryside also testify to the fact thatt the drive towards direct rule was imminent and that the traditional chiefs lost theirr legitimacy in the eyes of their own subjects.
Thee system of indirect rule based on subjects whose interests and control were inn the hands of their local notables was cracking down. The inability of those notables too efficiently challenge secular politics was a clear indicator. In sum, revolutions were AA proud Winston Churchill would reminisce on the use of the RAF of chemical weapons to suppress thee Sulaimniyy a Kurds' revolt for independence in 1921. But the nascent "national" Iraqi air force was firstfirst used to suppress llic revolts of the Diwaniyya peasants and lesser landlords who demanded more nghlss for the cultivators against big landlords (Sassoon 1987: 123) . "" A hasty reading of European history may take the above as evidence for the variance between the Mashreqq and the former cases But let us remember that the parliament was an institution that developedd in the struggle between the nobility and the monarchs even in Europe. Commenting on the adoptionn of the Magna Carta in 1688. Wood notes that: "Constitutionalism has, in fact, historically oftenn been aristocratic, even feudal, in its motivations: and while this docs not disqualify it as an importantt contribution to the development of 'limited" and 'responsible* government, a certain caution shouldd attend any effort to identify it with democracy" (Wood 1990: 83 fn). madee possible by the fact that the dominant classes lost their ideological-political Withh the exception of land reforms, the transitional revolutionaries had no planss to enact serious changes in the socio-economic spheres. Land reforms had an objectivee of putting a ceiling on the size of land owned by a single individual or family,, and distributing the confiscated land to landless peasants. Their enthusiastic callss for industrialization and the encouragement of national industry were translated intoo enacting legislation that gave more exemptions and bonuses to local private industrialistss and taxing imported goods. Hence, no étatism was preconceived by the urbann and transitional revolutionaries who undoubtedly shared the illusion that a class off national industrialists could be dissociated from the merchant and landed classes in orderr to launch the modernization programs. But the political changes and land reformss were more than sufficient to send an alarming message to the many members off the dominant classes who moved, or moved their liquid assets to the west, Lebanon andd other neighboring countries Thee social consequences of these developments were obviously favorable to thee rise of new juntas who were not constrained in their actions by organized lower classes,, or powerful dominant classes But these consequences would not have been sufficientt to ensure stability if the state had not acquired the potential for a relative financiall autonomy from the dominant classes. Whereas the social and political influencee of the old dominant classes had been eroded, their economic influence could nott have been curtailed and the revolutionary regimes would have succumbed into chaoss without this financial autonomy. The Mashreq states were able to achieve this thankss to two developments One was a new arrangement between the international oill consortium that controlled its oil production and the host governments to raise theirr shares of the oil revenues to fifty percent, thus causing spectacular hikes in the governments'' incomes. And the second was post-WWII international economic boom andd the cold war competition between the superpowers to gain influence in the Middlee East and their generosity to hand grants, aid, and easy loans to their prospectivee allies. To this should be added the rise of the national liberation tide whichh made the nationalization of western interests in the region one of the possibilitiess for governments under pressure to find sources of revenues Duee to all these combined forces, oil revenues in Iran rose from 11 percent of thee central government's total revenues in 1954 to 42 percent in 1960 (see table) . In Egypt,, the public sector's contribution to the GDP rose from 94 8 million Egyptian poundss in 1950 to 257.4 millions in 1958 thanks mainly to the nationalization of the Suezz Canal in 1956 . Iraq's oil revenues jumped from 6.7 million sterling pounds in 19500 to 51.3 in 1953 (Owen and Pamuk 1999; 260) . Although the Syrian state lacked thee natural resources or utilities that could bring her significant revenues, certain indicatorss show that its resources were expanding in the decade leading to revolutionaryy changes The state's share in gross capital formation rose from an annuall average of 43 million Syrian pounds in the period 1952-1954 to 109 millions duringg the period 1955-1958 and 171 millions during 1961-1964 In proportional termss the share of public investment rose from 18 percent in 1950 -1955 to 41.3 percentt in 1965 . The strategic location of Syria during the height of thee cold war era allowed it to reap benefits from the superpowers and later from the regionall wealthy neighbors 24 .
Lebanonn presents a case where big landed and merchants aristocracy dominatedd the social, economic and political scene just like in the other Mashreq countries.. The same symptoms of discontent, migrations and inability to absorb the unemployedd into remunerating activities led to several social outbursts. However, the statee could never evolve into an autonomous body, and the system of indirect rule was nowheree more pronounced than here. Parliamentary seats were (and still are) assigned too sects, whose deputies are expected to play the role of mediators between their constituenciess and the state apparatus. Iraq'ss withdrawal) was formed of the UK, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. The US had an observer membershipp in the pact. The Iraqi monarchy was heavily involved in coup attempts in Syria in order to draww the country to the pact. And a sandwiched Syria looked for revolutionary Egypt and the Soviet campp for aid. eventually entering into a short-lived unity with the former to form the United Arab Republicc under the leadership of Nasser. For more details, sec Seale 1965.
Source:: Batatu 1978: 106-7
Throughoutt the 1960s and early 1970s, a process of rise among descendents fromm the hitherto marginalized provinces was under way. The Shi'is, the most numerouss of sects, improved their socio-economic conditions, benefited from transferss from relatives and family members who engaged in lucrative trade activities inn west Africa. Sunnis from the southern city of Saida (Sidon), and Maronites from thee northern regions of Zgharta and Ihden were also on the rise, thanks to similar transferss from the oil-rich Arab countries for the Sunnis and from Africa for the second.. Although the rifts took the form of whole sects demanding fairer say in the politicss of their country, there was another, no less volatile one: that between the risingg strata of each sect and its "assigned" representatives The starkest example is thee budding of new Shi'i political organizations since the mid-1970s: Amal first, followedd by Hezbollah 25 .
Thee civil war was to partially fulfill the 'tasks' of the Mashreq's coups d'état: forcingg new leaders for the various sects into the body politics and opening the way forr social mobility for the newcomers. Thus the monopoly of the role of the speaker off parliament by the two big Shi'i landowning families, the Hamadas and al As'ads, wass abruptly ended and Amal's leaders occupied that role, while Hezbollah's deputies madee their regular presence in the parliament. As for the Sunni leadership, the traditionall families that occupied the post of prime minister hailed from the traditional aristocracyy of Beirut or Tripoli, or had established themselves so long in Beirut, that theyy lost touch with towns of origin and were considered Beirutis, like the Sulh family thatt originally came from Sidon. The outcome of the civil war was the eclipse of these familiess to the advantage of the nouveaux-riches from Sidon, like the post-civil war primee minister Rafiq al Hariri.
Thee fact that the Lebanese economy and society had been geared to banking, tradee and transit activities meant that the state could never develop a huge executive bodyy or an extensive armed force that would deplete the resources of the mam sectors. Whilee a military coup was almost impossible in Lebanon's case, a popular social revolutionn was equally difficult given the non-rise of a trans-sectarian hegemonic classs that could pose its demands as those of the whole nation. Whenever these demandss were raised and social tensions rose high, the country could easily slide into aa civil conflict.
Lebanon'ss specific situation is very instructive as a contrast to the developmentss in the rest of the Mashreq. Despite the violent fifteen-year long civil warr between 1975 and 1990, the country had to keep a facade of a parliamentary rule andd a multi-party system, a separation of authorities, free press, a fixed term for the president,, and the system of indirect rule. The change, as we have seen, was confined too the rise of new communal leaders from modest, and mainly provincial, backgroundss to partially or totally replace the old aristocratic leaders. A facade of a representativee system, which assumes that citizens are identified in sectarian terms, hass perpetuated the institution of indirect rule.
Commentatorss on Lebanon and the Middle East have mostly viewed these Shi'ite movements throughh the prism of their anti-Israeli operations. However, Amal (literally meaning hope in Arabic) wass established in the mid-1970s under the name of Harakat al Mahroumin: the Movement of the Deprivedd At that time, the radical Lebanese Shi'ites were mainly under the influence of the Lebanese Communistt Party. populationn acquiesces to dictatorships. And it is here that apathy towards city life comess to the forefront While urban revolutionaries saw their 'destructive' mission accomplishedd by cutting the roots of big landed aristocracies, with whom they shared noo common interests or sympathies, the more articulate and active sections of the Mashreqq population were looking for bettering off their conditions in the cities. The sceness of inequality, lavishness and affluence lied side by side with those of misery.
II have tried to show above that the revolutionary leaders' backgrounds, hailing fromm oppressed sects or regions, was instrumental in shaping their ways of perceiving classs divisions in their own societies, and their 'solutions' to harmonize their societies andd bring social justice. Those rulers may not have, and did not in many cases, harbor aa priori religious prejudices, but were driven to view the dominant and wealthy merchants,, bankers and affluent strata as hostile people belonging to privileged sects orr regions. Attempts at 'redressing' inequality inevitably turned into suspicion against establishedd urbans, especially those sharing confession with the dominant strata.
Ass the revolutions achieved the goals that were welcomed by the majority of thee population, fissures within the revolutionary camp surfaced as the eternal question off the outcome of the revolutions would reveal the narrowing of the common denominatorr between people hailing from different social structures and having differentt concerns. Revolutions ended up being monopolized by leaders who could nott trust but their kinsmen or personal friends to the top jobs, as ideological ties provedd to be insufficient for the formulation of concerted, concrete and detailed practicall policies.
Whatt made this outcome possible was not the power struggle in the top, but thee atomization of the Mashreq societies, the increasing capacity of the state to play a dominantt role in the economy, and a host of other factors that made nationalism, statismm and development look like identical/ non-competitive objectives And to this topicc we should turn now.
